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Bankruptcy

by Hon. John T. Laney, III*
and Nicholas J. Garcia"

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is a review of bankruptcy opinions issued in 2015 by the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, and the district courts and bankruptcy courts
within the Eleventh Circuit.' This Article covers issues regarding the
following bankruptcy topics: lien stripping, exemptions, fraudulent
transfers, the discharge injunction, executory contracts, and conversion.
II.

LIEN STRIPPING

Of the five bankruptcy caseS 2 decided by the United States Supreme
Court during the 2014 Term, only one originated from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals: Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett.' The issue
before the Supreme Court in Caulkett was whether a Chapter 7 debtor

* United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. Mercer
University (A.B., 1964); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna
cum laude, 1966). Member, Mercer Law Review (1964-1966); Co-Editor in Chief (19651966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Law Clerk to the Hon. John T. Laney, III. University of Georgia (A.B.J., cum laude,
2011); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2015).
Member, Mercer Law Review (2013-2015); Editor in Chief (2014-2015). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related opinions issued during the
prior survey period, see Hon. John T. Laney, III & Daniel Taylor, Bankruptcy, Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 66 MERCER L. REv. 881 (2015).
2. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015); Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015); Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932
(2015); Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015); Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct.
1686 (2015).
3. 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015). The Supreme Court consolidated the cases of Bank of
America, N.A. v. Caulkett and Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona in this opinion.
Id. at 1998.
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could avoid the claim of a junior mortgage lien holder under section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code4 in a situation where the claim of the
senior lien holder exceeded the present value of the collateral.' In an
opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's judgment and unanimously held that a debtor may
not avoid the junior lien in that situation.6
The facts of these consolidated cases are very simple. Bank of
America had a mortgage lien on the home of the debtor in each case.
Each mortgage lien was subordinate to a senior mortgage lien. The
values of the senior mortgage liens were greater than the market value
of the debtors' homes. Therefore, Bank of America's liens were "wholly
underwater"' because there was no remaining equity in the homes.'
During their respective Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the debtors moved to
strip off Bank of America's liens under § 506.? The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the debtors'
motions, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings
in those cases.'o
The following language of § 506(d) was at issue: "To the extent that
[the] lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void." The Supreme Court's determination
of whether the debtor could avoid the junior lien hinged on whether the
junior lienholder's claim was an "allowed secured claim." 2 Under
§ 506(a)(1), an allowed claim is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of the lienholder's interest in the collateral.' Likewise, the allowed
claim is unsecured to the extent that the value of the lienholder's
interest in the collateral is less than the amount of the lienholder's
allowed claim.1 4 Section 506(a)(1) appears to suggest that a lienholder

4. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2012). All statutory references hereinafter and not otherwise
denoted are to Title 11 of the United States Code, which is referred to as "the Bankruptcy

Code."
5.

Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1998.

6. Id.
7.
where
is less
8.
9.
10.
11.

"Underwater" is a term used by bankruptcy practitioners to describe a situation
the creditor's security interest is undersecured because the value of the collateral
than the value of the creditor's claim.
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1998.
11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1998.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)).

12. Id.
13.
14.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1998-99.
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whose interest has a value of zero cannot have a secured claim." The
Supreme Court noted that such a "straightforward reading of [§ 506]"
would mean that the debtors could avoid Bank of America's lien because
the values of Bank of America's interests are zero.'e However, the
Court did not adopt such a straightforward reading."
Instead, the Court relied on a previously adopted definition of a
"secured claim."" In Dewsnup v. Timm,' 9 the Court defined "secured
claim" under § 506(d) "to mean a claim supported by a security interest
in property, regardless of whether the value of that property would be
sufficient to cover the claim."20 In that case, a Chapter 7 debtor tried
to use § 506(d) to "strip down" an undersecured lien to the value of the
collateral. In other words, the debtor tried to reduce the value of the
lien to the value of the collateral and avoid the remaining balance of the
lienholder's claim. 2 ' Her argument was that claims were "secured only
to the extent of the judicially determined value of the [collateral]."22
The debtor relied on the definition of an "allowed secured claim" in
§ 506(a).23 In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court
determined that if the lienholder's claim "has been 'allowed' pursuant to
§ 502 ...
and is secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying
collateral, it does not come within the scope of § 506(d)." 24 Because
Bank of America's claims were allowed pursuant to § 50225 and were
secured by liens, they could not be avoided.2 6
The debtors in Caulkett also pleaded with the Court to limit the
Dewsnup decision to situations where the lienholder is partially
undersecured. 27 The Court reasoned that such an interpretation of
Dewsnup would create "an odd statutory framework." 28 A debtor would

15. Id. at 1999.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18.

Id.

19. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
20. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999.
21. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
22. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999 (quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 414).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
26. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 1999.
27. Id. at 1999-2000.
28. Id. at 2001. The Court also disposed of the debtor's argument that Dewsnup should
be limited to partially underwater liens for the following reasons: (1) the definition settled
on by the Court in that decision does not depend "on whether a lien [is] partially or wholly
underwater;" (2) the Court was reluctant to redefine "secured claim" in § 506(d) and create
two different definitions of a secured claim within § 506; and (3) the Supreme Court
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be allowed to strip down a junior lien if the court valued the collateral
at a dollar less than the senior lien but would be forbidden from doing
so if the value of the collateral was a dollar more than the senior lien.29
The Court determined that such an interpretation "could lead to
arbitrary results" because of the "constantly shifting value of real
property."30 Ultimately, this decision was a win for creditors who take
the risk of making loans secured by junior liens.
III.

A.

ExEMPTIONS

Annuities and Life Insurance Policies

A number of cases decided this past year by Eleventh Circuit courts
dealt with issues regarding exemptions. In McFarland v. Wallace (In re
McFarland),` the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia, denying
the debtor's claims of exemptions for an annuity worth $170,000 and
approximately $13,445 cash surrender value of a whole life insurance
policy. 2 The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the annuity focused on
statutory interpretation and case law.3 3 However, determining whether

the debtor could exempt the cash surrender value of his life insurance
policy involved statutory and constitutional questions.'
The debtor in this case took out a $30,000 whole life insurance policy.
When the debtor was 64 years old, he transferred $150,000 from a
mutual fund to an annuity. Under the terms of the annuity, the debtor's
wife was the beneficiary and was to receive payments beginning in 2032.
In February 2011, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After filing
for bankruptcy, he claimed exemptions for the full cash surrender value
of his whole life insurance policy and his annuity.3 5 The debtor made
those exemption claims under Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) sections 33-25-11(c) 3 6 and 44-13-100(a)(2)(E), 37 respective-

decision, Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993), does not shed light
on the meaning of a secured claim as the debtors argued. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
29. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. at 2001.
30. Id.
31. 790 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2015).
32. Id. at 1185-86. Standing as the first appellate court, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. Id. at
1185.
33. Id. at 1186-89.
34. Id. at 1189-91.
35. Id. at 1185-86.
36. O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) (2013).
37. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) (2002).
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ly.3 8 Section 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) of the O.C.G.A. permits the debtor to
exempt a payment under an annuity from becoming part of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate, the property of which is used to pay back creditors." The debtor argued his annuity should be exempt under the
statute, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.4 0
In Silliman v. Cassell,41 the Georgia Supreme Court defined "annuity" under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) as "an obligation to pay an
amount at regularintervals for a certain or uncertain period of time."42
Furthermore, the supreme court determined that an annuity must
provide for "income as a substitute for wages" to qualify for the annuity
exemption.43 In denying the debtor's claim for such an exemption, the
bankruptcy court found that the debtor's annuity was a future investment, as opposed to a substitute for wages, because he admitted to never
drawing money from the annuity and having no intentions of doing
so.44 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court and
Such
determined that its findings of facts were not clearly erroneous.
admissions made it apparent that the debtor's annuity was not operating
as a wage substitute." Therefore, the debtor could not exempt the
$170,000 from his annuity.47

38. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1186.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606 (2013).
42. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Silliman, 292 Ga. at 467, 738 S.E.2d
at 610).
43. Id. at 1187 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Silliman, 292 Ga. at 468, 738 S.E.2d at
610).
44. Id.
45. Id. The debtor admitted at the hearing before the bankruptcy court that he never
received any payments from the annuity and that the purpose of the annuity was to
provide money for his wife upon her becoming a widow. He made similar admissions
during depositions and at the § 341(a) creditor's meeting. The debtor also admitted on
appeal that he never drew money from the annuity and that he had no plans of doing so
until 2032 at the earliest. Id.
46. Id. at 1187. The debtor argued that the language of the annuity contract meets the
Silliman definition and that his annuity was operating as and intended to be a supplement
for his income. Id. at 1188. However, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the nature of the
contract as directed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Silliman. Id. The contract clearly
stated that payments would not begin until 2032. Id. Additionally, Silliman also directed
the court to look to the facts and circumstances of the annuity contract. Id. The fact that
the debtor never once drew on the annuity "doom[ed]" his claim for an annuity exemption.
Id.
47. Id. at 1187-88.
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Next, the Eleventh Circuit turned its focus to the life insurance
exemption.4 8 Section 44-13-100(a)(9)" of the O.C.G.A. provides for an
exemption for the debtor's aggregate interest in the cash value of any
unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor who is the
insured." Such an exemption is explicitly limited to $2000." On the
other hand, O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) provides for an exemption of "the
entire cash value of [the] whole life insurance policy."5 2 However, this
statute is a non-bankruptcy provision.
The Eleventh Circuit noted
that O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) specifically restricts bankruptcy debtors
to a cash value life insurance exemption of $2000.5
Therefore, a
bankruptcy debtor may not utilize O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) to circumvent
O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) and exempt an amount in excess of $2000.55
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that one argument to support
applying O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) to bankruptcy debtors is that the
enactment of that statute in 2006 shows the Georgia legislature's
intention "to amend, clarify, or repeal [O.C.G.A.] § 44-13-100(a)(9).""
To be clear, the debtor did not make such an argument.
However,
similarly situated debtors might pursue that argument in future
contested matters over life insurance exemptions.
The debtor also challenged O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) on two
constitutional grounds: (1) the statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia" because of its
classifications of bankruptcy debtors and non-bankruptcy debtors; and
(2) the lack of uniformity for life insurance exemptions under Georgia
law violates the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution of the United

48. Id. at 1189.
49. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) (2002).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 1189. Because Georgia opted out of the federal exemptions scheme, O.C.G.A.
§ 44-13-100 provides all of Georgia's bankruptcy exemptions that a debtor may claim. 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012); O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 (2002).
54. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1189-90.
55. Id. at 1190. In determining that the debtor could not utilize O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c)
in lieu of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9), the Eleventh Circuit noted, "The specific trumps the
general, plain and simple." In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1190. Furthermore, the court
noted in a footnote that O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) makes O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c)
"inapplicable"to the debtor. Id. at 1190 n.6.
56. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1190.
57. Id.
58. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, [ 2. "No person shall be denied the equal protection of laws."

Id.
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States"9 by "limiting bankruptcy debtors to the exemptions in O.C.G.A.
§ 44-13-100 while allowing non-bankruptcy debtors the protections
afforded in O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11."60 Applying the rational relationship
test,6 1 the Eleventh Circuit determined that classifying bankruptcy
debtors differently than other debtors does not violate the Georgia
constitution.6 2 It reasoned that the very purpose of bankruptcy law
requires treating bankruptcy debtors differently from non-bankruptcy
debtors.63 Therefore, the classifications of debtors under Georgia law
"[are] rational and relate[] directly to the purpose of bankruptcy
legislation."6 4
Faced with an issue of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit sided
with its sister circuits and held that O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) does not
violate the Bankruptcy Clause."
Interpreting § 522,66 the court
reasoned that the states are charged with defining bankruptcy exemp-

59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Congress shall have power "[t]o establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id.
60. McFarland v. Wallace, 516 B.R. 665, 668-69 (S.D. Ga. 2014).
61. "Where 'no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, ...
statutory
classifications are permitted when the classification is based on rational distinctions and
bears a direct relationship to the purpose of the legislation.'" In re McFarland, 790 F.3d
at 1192 (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374,
377, 418 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1992)).
62. Id.
63. Id. The court noted that bankruptcy law serves "to give the debtor a fresh start,"
"to collect all of the assets and liabilities of an entity," and "to pay the creditors of the
bankrupt to the fullest extent possible." Id. (quoting Menchise v. Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146,
1151 (11th Cir. 2008)).
64. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) creates a "greater
burden" for bankruptcy debtors than imposed on non-bankruptcy debtors under O.C.G.A.
§ 33-25-11(c). In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1192 (emphasis in original). However, the
court also noted that "states must balance the interests of both debtors and creditors when
creating bankruptcy exemptions." Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, imposing the
greater burden on the bankruptcy debtor by requiring them to "sacrifice more" of their life
insurance policy to obtain a "fresh start" appears to be the result of the Georgia Legislature
balancing both the interests of debtors and creditors. Id. (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 1193. Other circuits have faced such constitutional challenges in the scenario
"where a trustee was claiming that a state could not constitutionally distinguish between
a bankruptcy debtor and a non-bankruptcy debtor." Id. (emphasis in original). The
Eleventh Circuit cited decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth
Circuit. Id. (citing Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012);
Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009); Kulp v. Zeman (In re Kulp), 949 F.2d
1106 (10th Cir. 1991); Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2009)). The case before the Eleventh Circuit was the reverse of the situation before
its sister circuits, but the result was the same. Id.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012).
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tions for their residents and restricting those bankruptcy exemptions'
applicability.67 Additionally, no language in § 522 requires states to
"treat all debtors alike."6 8 Therefore, states are authorized to make
classifications of debtors under the Bankruptcy Code," and such an
"authorization does not fail to provide a uniform application of the
Bankruptcy Code in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause."70
B.

Health Savings Accounts
7
Last year, this Articlen
discussed In re Mooney,7 2 which was a case
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Georgia." The bankruptcy court found the debtor's health savings
account (HSA) was not exemptible under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C) 4 and (E) 5 because it was not intended as a substitute for wages;76 it was not an "illness benefit" or a payment on account of illness

under those statutes.
During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision."
The district court applied the same principles from Rousey v. Jacoway79
and Silliman that the bankruptcy court applied and determined that the

67. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1193, 1194.
68. Id. at 1194.
69. U.S.C. tit. 11 (2012).
70. In re McFarland, 790 F.3d at 1195.
71. See Laney & Taylor, supra note 1, at 888-89 for further analysis of the bankruptcy
court decision in In re Mooney.
72. 503 B.R. 916 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2014).
73. See id.
74. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C). This subsection allows bankruptcy debtors to exempt
their rights to receive disability, illness, or unemployment benefits. Id.
75. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E).
76. In re Mooney, 503 B.R. at 922. Similar to the Eleventh Circuit in In re McFarland,
the bankruptcy court in this case relied on the Georgia Supreme Court's reasoning in
Silliman: "[T]he 'common feature' of all the plans listed in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2) 'is
that they provide income that substitutes for wages.'" Id. at 919 (footnote omitted)
(quoting Silliman, 292 Ga. at 468, 738 S.E.2d. at 610). The bankruptcy court also relied
on Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005), a case discussed in Silliman. In re Mooney, 503
B.R. at 920. In Rousey, the Supreme Court held that an individual retirement account may
be exempt under § 522(d)(10)(E) because it is "a right to receive payments 'on account of
age'" and a substitute for wages. Id. (quoting Rousey, 544 U.S. at 324).
77. In re Mooney, 503 B.R. at 920, 921.
78. Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), No. 1:14-CV-54(WLS), 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis
22964, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2015).
79. 554 U.S. 320 (2005).

2016]

BANKRUPTCY

827

debtor's HSA could not be exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C).so The district court reasoned that the debtor's HSA was a "taxpreferred place[] to park [wages]" rather than a substitute for wages.
Distinguished from the "payment vehicles" a debtor may exempt under
Georgia law, "HSA funds are never taxed if used for qualified healthcare
[expenses]."8 2 The district court also determined that the debtor's HSA
was not exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(C) because legislative
history did not show a legislative intent to treat HSAs as a benefit under
bankruptcy exemption law.8 3
C.

"Wildcard"

In Valone v. Waage (In re Valone),84 the issue before the Eleventh
Circuit was whether debtors who did not claim a homestead exemption
in their bankruptcy schedules were eligible to claim a "wildcard"
exemption." Both the bankruptcy court and district court for the
Middle District of Florida held that the debtors were ineligible for the
wildcard exemption.8 6 However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court.8 7
As provided in section 222.25 of the Florida Statutes," a "wildcard"
exemption allows a debtor who does not claim or receive the benefits of
a homestead exemption" to claim an exemption for interests in

80. In re Mooney, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22964, at *7; see also supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
81. In re Mooney, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22964, at *8 (quoting Leitch v. Christians (In
re Leitch), 494 B.R. 918, 921 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013)).
82. Id. at *7-8 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at *8. On March 24, 2015, the debtor filed an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964, appeal docketed No. 1511229 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015). Oral arguments before the Eleventh Circuit took place
on January 14, 2016. On February 11, 2016 the Eleventh Circuit certified the following
three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) "Does a debtor's health savings account
constitute a right to receive a 'disability, illness, or unemployment benefit'. . .?"; (2) Does
it "constitute a right to receive a 'payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract?'"; and (3) "Is a debtor's right to receive a payment from a health savings account 'on
account of illness [or] disability?'" Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), 812 F.3d 1276, 1283
(11th Cir. 2016).
84. 784 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 2015).
85. Id. at 1400.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.25(4) (West 1998).
89. Florida's homestead exemption, as provided in Article X, section 4 of the Florida
Constitution, allows a debtor to exempt up to 160 acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon if their residence is located outside a municipality. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
If the residence is located within a municipality, the debtor may exempt up to one-half acre
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personal property up to $4000.90 Joint debtors are able to claim
wildcard exemptions for interests in personal property up to $8000; the
statute allows for a $4000 exemption per debtor.91
The husband and wife debtors in this case filed a joint petition under
Chapter 13. They did not claim a homestead exemption. The court
presumed the debtors did not claim a homestead exemption because they
had no equity in their home. However, the husband and wife debtors
each claimed a wildcard exemption.92
The Chapter 13 Trustee argued the debtors were ineligible to claim
wildcard exemptions because they "receivedthe benefits of the homestead
exemption" by filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy." In a footnote, the
court explained that the "automatic stay" under § 362(a)9 4 generally
In a
remains in effect until the debtor receives his discharge."
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor receives a discharge after liquidation
of the assets in the bankruptcy estate and payment of the debtor's
creditors.9 6 However, a court will not discharge a debtor in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy until the debtor completes all the payments required
under the Chapter 13 plan." The court noted that "in Chapter 13
cases, unsecured creditors never have the chance to force a liquidation
of debtors' assets to satisfy their claims."
The bankruptcy court determined that a "debtor receives the benefit
of the homestead exemption during the life of his Chapter 13 plan"
because he "is protected by the automatic stay" for the duration of the
plan.99 Contrarily, the Eleventh Circuit held "that the filing of a
petition under Chapter 13 . .. by a Florida debtor who owns, or debtors

of contiguous land and the exemption is limited to the residence. Id.
90.
91.
92.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 225.25(4).
See id.
In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1400.

93. Id. at 1401 (emphasis added).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
95. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1400 n.2. The automatic stay remains in effect until prepetition interests in "property [are] no longer [part] of the estate." 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY [ 362.06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. (2011)). The
automatic stay terminates on pre-petition acts other than those against property upon the
case being closed, the case being dismissed, or the debtor receiving a discharge, whichever
occurs first. Id.
96. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1400 n.2. Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
4004(a), subject to the exceptions enumerated in that rule, the court must grant the debtor
a discharge upon the expiration of the time fixed for creditors to object to the discharge.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).

97. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1400 n.2.
98. Id.

99. In re Valone, 500 B.R. 645, 650-51 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
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who own, homestead property does not foreclose the availability of
00
Florida's wildcard exemption to that debtor or those debtors."o
Eligibility for the wildcard exemption depends on whether the debtor
received the protection from foreclosure on his homestead "from the
If the debtor does not expressly claim a
homestead exemption."'
homestead exemption but receives such protection either directly or
indirectly from the homestead exemption, the debtor is ineligible to
claim a wildcard exemption.1 02 Thus, protections afforded by the
automatic stay do not prohibit debtors from claiming wildcard exemptions.
IV.

FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS: REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE

Section 548(a)(1)(B)(i) 0 a permits a trustee to avoid a transfer of the
debtor's interest in property or an obligation incurred by the debtor that
occurred within two years of the debtor's filing for bankruptcy if the
debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation."0 4 In PSN Liquidating Trust v. Intelsat
Corp. (In re PSN USA, Inc.),o' the Eleventh Circuit determined a
debtor receives "reasonably equivalent value" for transfers even if the
benefit received was indirect and the result of a contract made by a
parent corporation.'0 6 The debtor in that case, PSN USA, Inc. (PSN),
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2002. PSN was a Delaware
corporation that operated the PSN Channel out of Miami, Florida. PSN
Channel broadcasts sporting events occurring in Latin America. PSN
was wholly owned by a non-operating holding company named Pan
American Sports Network International (PSNI), a Cayman Island
PSNI was not involved in the actual production or
corporation.
operation of the PSN Channel, but rather, PSNI would acquire the

100. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1401. The Eleventh Circuit noted its holding is in
accordance with Osborne v. Dumoulin, 55 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 2011), which explained a debtor
may receive the benefits of the homestead exemption without claiming a homestead
exemption. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1401. The Florida Supreme Court in Osborne held
that the debtor in that case was ineligible for a wildcard exemption. 55 So. 3d at 580.
101. In re Valone, 784 F.3d at 1403-04 (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 1404. The court provided an example where a debtor may not expressly
claim the homestead exemption yet would receive the benefits of the homestead exemption:
"[A] married debtor does not claim the homestead exemption in his petition but his
nondebtor spouse retain[s] the right to the homestead exemption." Id. (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Osborne, 55 So. 3d at 589).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
104. Id.
105. 615 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2015).
106. Id. at 925-26.
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rights to broadcast sporting events and would contract with satellite
providers. PSNI contracted with Intelsat International Systems, LLC
(Intelsat) for Intelsat to provide the satellite services necessary for PSN
to distribute the PSN Channel as part of cable packages throughout
Latin America. PSN was not a party to the contracts with Intelsat;
however, PSN paid the contractual obligations owed to Intelsat. 1 7
PSN Liquidating Trust (the trust)1 08 sought to avoid payments the
debtor made under the contract from August 7, 2000 to January 8, 2002.
During that period, PSN transferred over $3 million to Intelsat. The
trust argued the transfers were constructively fraudulent under
§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i) because PSN did not receive reasonably equivalent value
for the payments made to Intelsat."o' According to the trust, PSN
received no benefit from the services Intelsat provided because PSN was
not a party to the contract with Intelsat.1 o
The bankruptcy court held PSN received reasonably equivalent value
for two reasons: (1) PSN "received and used the satellite services;" and
(2) PSNI and PSN "shared an identity of interests, such that any benefit
PSNI received under the contract also indirectly benefited [PSN]."'1
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, and the Eleventh
Circuit followed suit.'12 The Eleventh Circuit noted, "The general rule
is that payment of or assumption of a third party's debt by an insolvent
is a transfer without fair consideration and is thus fraudulent."113
However, such a transfer is not avoidable if the transfer "confers an
economic benefit upon the debtor, either directly or indirectly.""' The

107.

Id. at 926. It was the network's policy for PSN to pay all production expenses.

Id.
108. The debtor's confirmed plan of liquidation created the trust and "authorized [it]
to prosecute the Debtor's avoidance and recovery actions." Id. at 927.
109. Id. at 926, 927. Under the constructive-fraud provision, the trustee must also
show the debtor is in a "fragile financial condition" at the time of the transfer or will be in
such a condition as a result of the transfer. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 1[ 548.05[3] (Alan
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. (2011)). The trustee can meet this burden
by showing the debtor "was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation." 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). In In re PSN USA, Inc., the parties did not dispute PSN's
fragile financial condition. 615 F. App'x at 928.
110. In re PSN USA, Inc., 615 F. App'x at 927.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted the circuit court reviews the judgment from the
bankruptcy court independently from that of the district court, despite the actual appeal
to the circuit being from the district court. Id.
113. Id. at 928 (quoting Butz v. Sohigro Serv. Co. (In re Evans Potato Co.), 44 B.R. 191,
193 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984)).
114. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. of Tenn. v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d
725, 727 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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bankruptcy court found that PSN received the economic benefit of the
satellite services and transponder capacity Intelsat provided under the
contract with PSNI."' Additionally, the bankruptcy court determined
PSN and PSNI "shared an 'identity of interests' as a 'single enterTherefore, any benefit PSNI received would indirectly
prise."' 1 1 6
benefit PSN."' The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy
1
court and determined its findings of facts were not clearly erroneous." s
V.

DISCHARGE INJUNCTION

Pursuant to § 524(a)(2),"9 a discharge "operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action . .. or an act, to
collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the
debtor."' 2 0 The "novel question" before the Eleventh Circuit in Green
Point Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean)121 was "whether a creditor
violates the discharge injunction under § 524(a)(2) by filing a proof of
claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to collect a debt that was discharged
in a previous bankruptcy proceeding."1 2 2 The Eleventh Circuit determined the creditor violated the discharge injunction and adopted an
objective test for determining whether a proof of claim violates § 524(a)(2). 123
In 2006, the debtors in this case filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
24
The debtors listed Green Point Credit, LLC (Green Tree)1 as the
unsecured creditor in that case. The bankruptcy court converted the
case to a Chapter 7 and entered a discharge order, of which Green Tree

115. Id.
116. Id. at 929.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 930.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
120. Id.
121. 794 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015).
122. Id. at 1317. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the debtors' adversary proceeding. Id. at 1318. The
basis of the issue was the bankruptcy court's enforcement of a discharge injunction issued
under a case number different from the debtors' pending bankruptcy. Id. at 1319. The
pending bankruptcy was filed in the same court as the prior bankruptcy, and the same
judge presided over both cases. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding because of its statutory contempt power
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1319-20.
123. In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1321-22.
124. The defendants in this case were Green Point Credit, LLC and Green Tree
Servicing, LLC. Id. For the purposes of this Article, Green Tree Servicing, LLC and all
affiliated entities will be referred to as "Green Tree."
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received notice. In 2012, the debtors again filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy but did not list Green Tree as a creditor. Attempting to
recover the same debt sought in the first Chapter 13 case, Green Tree
filed a proof of claim in the second case. While the debtors' objection to
the Green Tree claim was pending, the debtors filed an adversary
proceeding against Green Tree, alleging a violation of § 524(a)(2). Green
Tree withdrew its claim shortly thereafter; however, the debtors
continued with their action. They sought to recover actual damages for
emotional distress caused by the filing of the proof of claim and
sanctions against Green Tree. The bankruptcy court found Green Tree
in violation of the discharge injunction.125 The court awarded the
debtors "compensatory sanctions for their emotional distress" and
"coercive sanctions" - non-compensatory sanctions imposed to encourage
Green Tree to correct the acts that caused their violation.1 26 On
appeal, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama affirmed the bankruptcy court decision.1 27
The Eleventh Circuit determined the phrase "as a personal liability of
the debtor" in § 524(a)(2) was ambiguous.1 28 Green Tree argued a
proof of claim does not violate the discharge injunction because it is a
claim against the debtors' bankruptcy estate as opposed to a claim
against the debtors personally. 1 29 Focusing on the legislative history
of § 524(a)(2), the Eleventh Circuit determined the purpose of the statute
was to "insure that once a debt is discharged, the debtor will not be
pressured in any way to repay it."'s Interpreting this language, other
circuits have concluded the "'pressure' to repay a debt" is the decisive
factor in determining "whether the action affected the debtor's personal
liability."1 3 1 Similarly to its sister courts, the Eleventh Circuit held
"that the test for whether a creditor violates the discharge injunction. .
is whether the objective effect of the creditor's action is to pressure a
debtor to repay a discharged debt, regardless of the legal entity against
which the creditor files its claim."' 3 2
Applying the objective effect test, the Eleventh Circuit determined
Green Tree's filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect, recover,
or offset a previously discharged debt "as a personal liability of the

125. Id. at 1317-18.
126. Id. at 1318.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1321.
129. Id. at 1320.
130. Id. at 1321 (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 366 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6322).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1322 (emphasis added).
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debtor[s]."' 3 The court provided two reasons for its conclusion: (1) the
filing of a proof of claim was an indirect act to collect the discharged
debt because that act is the first step in collecting a debt through a
bankruptcy case; and (2) it was an act to collect the discharged debt "as
a personal liability" because the proof of claim increased the debtors'
projected Chapter 13 plan payments. 3 4
In Henriquez v. Green ree Servicing, LLC (In re Henriquez),'3 the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia
applied the Eleventh Circuit's objective effect test to determine whether
certain acts violated the discharge injunction.'a The issue before the
bankruptcy court was whether a loan servicer violated the discharge
injunction by sending letters to the debtor and reporting information to
credit bureaus."' The debtors in this case filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and received a discharge. On their Chapter 7 Individual
Debtor's Statement of Intention form the debtors disclosed an intent to
retain real property located in Massachusetts, which secured a mortgage
from Bank of America (the Loan). The debtors contended they made the
decision to surrender the property sometime after receiving their
discharge. Bank of America transferred the Loan to Everbank. The
defendant, Green Tree, serviced the Loan for Everbank. Green Tree
foreclosed on the property and recorded the deed. Green Tree sent
written communications to the debtors' address in Georgia, communicated over the phone with the debtors,'
and reported information
pertaining to the Loan to credit bureaus.' 3 ' The written communications consisted of two varieties: "(1) informational letters; and (2) letters
notifying the [debtors] that [Green Tree] will and eventually did place
insurance on the Property and that the [debtors] are responsible for the
cost."'
The debtors reopened their bankruptcy case to pursue an

133. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)).
134. Id. at 1322-23. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case back to the bankruptcy
court to reconsider the "coercive sanctions" imposed on Green Tree. Id. at 1323, 1325. The
Eleventh Circuit determined the sanctions were punitive and therefore "remind[ed] the
bankruptcy court of the proper standard . . . [for] impos[ing] punitive sanctions." Id. at
1325. The Eleventh Circuit also remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court for
reconsideration of the compensatory damages it originally awarded. Id. at 1326.
135. 536 B.R. 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).
136. Id. at 345.
137. Id. at 343.
138. The debtors argued the phone calls initiated by them violated the discharge
injunction. Id. at 349. However, the debtors did not present any evidence to support this
allegation. Id.
139. Id. at 342-43.
140. Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
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adversary proceeding, alleging a violation of the discharge injunction.1 4 1

Applying the objective effect test, the bankruptcy court found in favor
of Green Tree.142 The bankruptcy court noted that a "discharge does
not eliminate a secured creditor's lien against the [subject] property;" it
only "eliminates the debtor's personal liability on the secured debt.""
Additionally, the discharge injunction only prohibits communications
"designed to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability
of the debtor."'" The informational letters and the notifications Green
Tree sent regarding insurance contained disclaimers, which explicitly
stated in bold, capital letters that the communications were not attempts
to collect the debt.' 4' The court also found the letters did not contain
statements regarding "the amount due under the Loan, the amount
delinquent, a payoff amount, or demand payment."'4 6 Based on these
findings of facts, the bankruptcy court determined the informational
letters and the notifications regarding insurance did not have the
objective effect of pressuring the debtors to pay the discharged debt.'
Likewise, the bankruptcy court determined Green Tree did not violate
the discharge injunction by reporting information to credit bureaus. 4
The bankruptcy court noted, "Reporting a debt to a credit reporting
agency in and of itself is not a violation of the discharge injunction.""
The credit reports at issue showed the Loan was discharged and had a

141. Id. The debtors sought to recover compensatory damages, damages for emotional
distress, and punitive damages. Id.
142. Id. at 346.
143. Id. at 345.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 345-47. The informational letters contained at least one of the following
phrases: (1) "THIS INFORMATIONAL NOTICE IS SENT TO YOU IN ORDER TO
IT IS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
COLLECT THE DEBT;" (2) "THIS INFORMATIONAL NOTICE IS NOT AN ATTEMPT
TO COLLECT A DEBT;" and (3) "this communication is not intended as an attempt to
collect a debt from you personally." Id. at 346. The disclaimers appeared at the beginning
of the letters, at the top of the second or third pages, or both. Id.
146. Id. at 346.
147. Id. at 346-47. The bankruptcy court also noted the two notifications sent
regarding insurance were in compliance with 12 U.S.C. § 2605(1) (2012), known as the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), Pub. L. No. 93-533, §§ 6-7, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012)). In re Henriquez, 536 B.R. at 348. Green
Tree sent the notices to protect its in rem rights to collect the cost of insurance from the
sale. Id. Furthermore, the debtors did not present any evidence that Green Tree sent
repeated notices or more than was required by RESPA, or that Green Tree attempted to
collect the cost of insurance from the debtors personally. Id.
148. In re Henriquez, 536 B.R. at 349.
149. Id. at 348.
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balance of zero.' 50 The court found that such a report was appropriate
for a discharged loan.' 5 ' The bankruptcy court determined Green Tree
did not violate the discharge injunction by providing such information
to credit bureaus because reporting such information was not an act
designed to coerce or pressure the debtors to pay a debt.15 2
These cases presented two factually different examples where the
courts applied the objective effect test to determine if a creditor violated
the discharge injunction. At the very least, the decisions provide
guidance on the "dos" and "don'ts" for creditors of a discharged debt.
VI.

EXECUTORY CONTRACTS: UNEXPIRED FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS

In Moe's Franchisor,LLC v. Taylor Investment PartnersII, LLC (In re

Taylor Investment PartnersII, LLC),"' the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a franchisor relief
from the automatic stay to terminate franchise agreements between the
franchisor and the debtor.'"' The issue before the bankruptcy court
was whether the restriction on assuming or assigning executory
contracts under § 365(c)' applies to a debtor in possession.'"' The
debtor, Taylor Investment Partners II (TIP), was the franchisee of record
for two Moe's Southwestern Grill (Moe's) franchises: one in Atlanta,
Georgia and the other in Decatur, Georgia. The franchise agreements
between Moe's and TIP allowed Moe's to terminate the agreements upon
three failures of Restaurant Operation and Standards Evaluations
(ROSE) inspections in a twelve-month period. After TIP failed three
consecutive ROSE inspections between June 2012 and February 2013,
TIP was in default. The parties underwent arbitration to resolve a
dispute over the results of the ROSE inspections, the result of which was
a recommendation for an additional inspection. When the Decatur
location failed the additional inspection, Moe's sent notice of the
termination of the franchise agreement and mandated that TIP sell or
vacate the premises within six months. TIP filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy before the six-month period expired.5 7
Section 365(c) provides the trustee may not assume an executory
contract if applicable law would excuse the other party from "rendering

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349.
Id.
533 B.R. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).
Id. at 838.
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2012).
In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 840.
Id. at 838-39.
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performance to an entity other than the debtor" and the other party
Moe's argued TIP cannot
"does not consent to such assumption."'
assume the franchise agreement because a trustee would not be able to
assume it.' Moe's reasoned the applicable trademark law prevented
TIP from assigning the franchise agreement without its consent;
therefore, "a trustee could not assume the franchise agreement" because
Moe's withheld consent.1 60 Under § 1107,"l a debtor in possession
is limited to the powers of a trustee.' 6 2 Moe's argued TIP, as a debtor
in possession, did not have the power to assume the franchise agreement
because Moe's withheld consent to do so.16 3
As noted by the bankruptcy court, circuits are split on whether
§ 365(c) applies to debtors in possession. " The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the
"hypothetical test."'6 Those circuits determined a debtor in possession
may not assume an executory contract if applicable law would bar
assignment of the executory contract to a hypothetical third party.1 6 6
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has adopted the "actual test."' As explained by the bankruptcy court, the First Circuit applied § 365(e)(1)165 to invalidate a provision of a limited partnership agreement which converted the debtors'
general partnership interests for the benefit of the other partners upon
the filing of their bankruptcy petitions.' 6 9 The First Circuit analogized

158. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); see also In re Taylor Inv. Partners II, LLC, 533 B.R. at 839.
159. In re Taylor Inc. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 839.
160. Id.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012).
162. Id.
163. In re Taylor Inc. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 839.
164. Id. at 840.
165. See id. at 840, 841; see also RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra
Corp.), 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004); Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult
Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); see also In re W. Elec., Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1988).
166. In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 840-41. The material facts of In
re CatapultEntertainment, Inc. are more akin to those in In re Taylor Investment Partners
II, LLC. Compare id. at 841 with In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 748-50. The
debtor in Catapult entered into two license agreements with a licensor. The debtor
corporation sought to assume the license contracts with the licensor through its Chapter
11 plan. The licensor objected to such plan provisions on the basis that the debtor, as a
debtor in possession, could not assume the contracts because a trustee would be barred by
patent law from assuming such contracts. In re CatapultEntm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 748-49.
167. In re Taylor Inc. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 841; see also Summit Inv. & Dev.
Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2012).
169. In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 840, 843.
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§ 365(c) and § 365(e)(2) 7 0 despite § 365(c) not being at issue.'' The
court determined such provisions "[were] not meant to apply unless the
executory contract would actually be assumed or assigned by a nondebtor party."17 2 The Eleventh Circuit in City of Jamestown v. James
Cable Partners, L.R (In re James Cable Partners, L.P)... faced the
same issue: whether § 365(c)(1) barred a debtor in possession from
assuming an executory contract. 7 4 Analyzing that provision, the
Eleventh Circuit articulated the following rule: a debtor in possession
may not assume an executory contract if (1) applicable law would excuse
the other party to that contract from accepting performance from a party
other than debtor in possession and (2) that other party does not consent
to the assumption. 7 176 TIP argued the Eleventh Circuit's articulation of the "hypothetical test" was dicta and not binding.1 7 7 The
bankruptcy court disagreed."" It determined the Eleventh Circuit
"unequivocally" held a plain reading of § 365(c) burdens a debtor in
possession.17 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held TIP could not
Furthermore, the court found
assume the franchise agreements.'
entitled Moe's to seek its
which
cause existed to lift the automatic stay,
state law remedies with respect to the franchise agreements.'

170. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (2012). This section states that § 365(e)(1) does not apply if
"applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from
accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or to an assignee of
such contract or lease." 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A)(i).
171. In re Taylor Inc. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 840.
172. Id. The bankruptcy court also noted a third approach. Id. at 841. According to
the bankruptcy court, the court in In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005),
focused its analysis on the interaction between § 365(c) and § 1107 and determined § 365(c)
"does not say that the debtor or debtor in possession may not assume or assign - the
prohibition applies on its face to the 'trustee.'" In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R.
at 841 (quoting In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. at 570). The bankruptcy court for the
Northern District of Georgia opined that this "pragmatic approach ... ha[d] appeal." Id.
173. 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994).
174. Id. at 535.
175. In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 840 (citing In re James Cable
Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d at 537-38).
176. Id. at 537-38.
177. In re Taylor Inv. PartnersII, LLC, 533 B.R. at 841.
178. Id. at 842.

179. Id.
180.
181.

Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843-44.
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CONVERSION

2

In Harris v. Viegelahn,18 the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split
on the treatment of post-petition wages possessed by a Chapter 13
trustee when a debtor converts from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7
case.' 83 Post-petition wages are treated differently depending on the
chapter under which the debtor files for bankruptcy.'
Section
1306(a)'85 provides that post-petition wages become property of the
estate in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.'"' Generally, the Chapter 13
trustee is responsible for collecting the portion of post-petition wages
necessary to fund the Chapter 13 plan and pay back the debtor's
creditors.' 7 However, Chapter 7 debtors are permitted to keep their
post-petition wages."' When a debtor fails to complete a Chapter 13
plan, the debtor has the option of converting to Chapter 7.Va" Upon
conversion, the Chapter 13 trustee's duties in the case are terminated. 9 o However, upon termination, "[m]ay the trustee distribute the
accumulated wage payments to creditors as the Chapter 13 plan
required, or must she remit them to the debtor?"'
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, the Supreme Court
reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and
held that the Chapter 13 trustee must return post-petition wages to the
debtor.'9 2 The Court reasoned that § 348(f)(1)(A) 19 "removes [postpetition wages] from the pool of assets that may be liquidated and
distributed to creditors."' 4
Allowing the terminated Chapter 13
trustee to distribute post-petition wages to creditors would be "incompatible with that statutory design.""

182. 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015).
183. Id. at 1836. This case did not originate in the Eleventh Circuit; however, it is
worth discussing because of its implications on the duties of Chapter 13 trustees.
184. Id. at 1835.
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2012).
186. Id.
187. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1835.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
189. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1835.
190. Id. at 1836.
191. Id. at 1835.
192. Id. at 1837.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A) (2012).
194. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1837.
195. Id.
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The Court also analyzed § 348(e)' 96 in reaching its conclusion.'
That section provides the services of a Chapter 13 trustee terminate
when a debtor converts from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.198 A function
of the Chapter 13 trustee is to provide the service of distributing
"payments to creditors."' Therefore, "[t]he moment a case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, . . . the Chapter 13 trustee is stripped
of authority to provide that 'service.'"2 00
Once a debtor converts from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the provisions
within Chapter 7 govern the case.20 1 Accordingly, the former Chapter
13 trustee must recognize that her duties under the case are terminated
upon conversion and cease payments under the Chapter 13 plan.202
The Supreme Court's ruling in this case has forced the United States
Trustee's office to revise their fee collection procedures. Likewise,
districts may be required to revise any Local Bankruptcy Rule (LBR)
that conflicts with the Harris decision.0
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court contributed to the ever-developing law on lien stripping. The Court's ruling was
a win for creditors holding underwater junior liens. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and determined a Chapter 13
trustee must return post-petition wages to a debtor upon conversion to
a Chapter 7. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit faced issues of first impression regarding exemptions and the
discharge injunction. The Eleventh Circuit resolved those unprecedented
issues by upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia exemption statute
and establishing a bright line rule for determining violations of the
discharge injunction. The year 2015 certainly brought answers to many
statutory and factual questions raised by consumer and corporate
bankruptcy litigants. However, more questions remain to be answered
for bankruptcy practitioners in 2016.

196. 11 U.S.C. § 348(e) (2012).
197. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1838.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 348(e).
199. Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1838 (emphases in original).
200. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 348(e)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District revised Local
Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1 - Compensation of Professionals - to eliminate portions of that
rule that conflicted with the holding of Harris. Bankr. M.D. Ga. LBR 2016-1 (2016).

